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I. ABSTRACT  
Rights are, without a doubt, the most outstanding feature of 
contemporary legal systems. It can be argued that since the middle 
of the past century we are immersed in a culture of rights. Neo-
constitutionalism is one among other such concepts that has been 
used to designate and study this phenomenon. The hypothesis we 
will attempt to address in this paper is that some of the central 
characters of our culture of rights, here termed as “neo-
constitutionalism,” cannot be explained consistently without an 
explicit reference to natural law.  
 ∗  Researcher, Institute for Culture and Society, Frontiers and Borders, 
University of Navarra, Spain; Professor of Jurisprudence, Austral University, 
Argentina; Researcher, Argentine National Council for the Research in the 
Humanities (CONICET); jcianciardo@ius.austral.edu.ar. 
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We will specifically examine the connection between the 
assertion that there exist natural law principles of justice and the 
following characteristics of our culture of rights: a) the recognition 
of rights; b) the reference of state or national legal systems to 
supranational legal systems; c) constitutions as a result of a 
network of principles and rules; d) the principle of proportionality; 
and e) the principle of reasonableness. While the first three 
characteristics constitute the structure of any neo-constitutional 
practice, the two latter ones are features of the processes of legal 
reception and legal allocation of rights in such a legal practice. 
This paper aims to show that, ultimately, identifying, explaining, 
and understanding each and all of these five characteristics of 
contemporary legal culture depends upon the existence of a 
normative resort that goes beyond the legal culture itself. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
The recognition of human rights is, without a doubt, the most 
outstanding feature of contemporary legal systems. It can be 
argued that since the middle of the past century we are immersed 
in a culture of rights. Neo-constitutionalism is one among many 
concepts that has been used to designate and study this 
phenomenon. The hypothesis we will address in this paper is that 
some of the central characters of our culture of rights, here referred 
to as “neo-constitutionalism,” cannot be explained consistently 
without a reference to natural law. 
In order to highlight this general statement, I will address today 
the conceptual connection between natural law and the following 
features of neo-constitutional practices: a) the recognition of rights; 
b) the relationship between state legal systems and supra-state 
legal systems; c) constitutions resulting from a framework of 
principles and rules; d) the principle of proportionality; and e) the 
principle of reasonableness.  
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The first three features are dimensions to the overall structure 
of neo-constitutional states, while the two latter are features of the 
legal determination and judicial enforcement of human rights. This 
paper aims to show that identifying, explaining, and understanding 
each and all of these five characteristics of contemporary legal 
culture depends upon the existence of a normative instance which 
is beyond the legal culture itself. 
III. RIGHTS AND THEIR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
In an article written thirty years ago, Javier Hervada made 
some observations that, with the passage of time, have gained 
interest.1 Hervada noted that: a) the whole of the International 
Conventions, Declarations and Treaties on human rights explicitly 
stated that they “acknowledged” or “recognized” the rights there 
enumerated, and b) that this explicit “recognition” posed 
“problems” for the philosophy of law of his time. Hervada was 
correct in both cases. First, human rights are acknowledged, as is 
shown in the explicit language used in all legal texts concerning 
them. This language aims at distinguishing these rights from other 
kind of rights, whose proximate ground or root is the fact that a 
competent legal authority has made a decision. Secondly, Hervada 
maintained that this language of “recognition” posed problems for 
the philosophy of law, especially for legal positivism which was 
widely present in Spanish legal philosophy at the moment in which 
that article was written. If, as positivism asserts, law is 
fundamentally and exclusively positive law, and if the obligatory 
nature of positive law is fully based upon its mere existence as a 
social practice, then there is no room for pre-existing rights. The 
whole of positive law and therefore of positive rights would be the 
product of the choice of the person or of the group of persons 
 1. Javier Hervada, Problemas que una nota esencial de los derechos 
humanos plantea a la filosofía del derecho, 9 PERSONA Y DERECHO 243, 256 
(1982). 
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socially empowered with the authority to do so, with no further 
limit than their imagination.  
Therefore, if the positivist approach to the study of law was the 
only one possible, we would be forced to choose between two 
alternatives: a) either the assimilation of human rights to positive 
rights, which is a conceptual contradiction; b) or the assertion that 
rights are pure fiction and cannot be rationally based. Both ways 
pose multiple difficulties which cannot be discussed here.2 Yet, it 
is worth noticing the existence of an alternative solution, consisting 
in connecting the concept of human rights with basic human 
good,3 and simultaneously preserving the determinative or positive 
dimension of human rights law (both in the area of legislation as 
well as in the adjudication process).  
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SCOPE OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND 
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS  
In the last thirty years, we have witnessed a process of 
recognition, promotion, and protection of human rights, both 
within the boundaries of national states and in the international 
field. Although these national and international processes are 
generally converging movements, they sometimes conflict between 
each other. What should be done when these conflicts emerge? 
Which of the two should take preeminence? Three answers have 
been set forth in the history of public international law: for national 
monism, priority is given to state law; for international monism, on 
the other hand, priority is given to international law; whereas, with 
dualism, each system has its own independent criteria for validity 
or recognition.  
 2. PEDRO SERNA BERMÚDEZ, POSITIVISMO CONCEPTUAL Y 
FUNDAMENTACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (EUNSA 1990); Pedro Serna 
Bermúdez, El derecho a la vida en el horizonte cultural europeo de fin de siglo 
in EL DERECHO A LA VIDA 79 (Carlos I. Massini Correas & Pedro Serna eds., 
EUNSA 1998). 
 3. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59 (2d ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2011). 
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In the case of Argentina, those who support state monism 
usually cite two texts from the Constitution itself to support their 
stance: article 27, which establishes that international agreements 
should conform to constitutional public law principles, and article 
31, which refers to the “Supreme Law of the Nation,” and states its 
content in the following order: “this Constitution, the laws of the 
Nation that in its consequence are dictated by Congress, and the 
treaties with foreign powers.”4  
Those advocating for the other two perspectives, international 
monism or dualism, argue on the basis of international law texts. 
For example, they look at the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which establishes in article 27 that “a party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty.”5As Carlos Nino accurately noticed, 
“the interesting thing about this controversy is that both positions 
are completely circular, since those who defend the priority of the 
constitution support their arguments by the constitution itself, and 
those who defend the precedence of international conventions 
support their arguments by international conventions.”6 This 
shows, the author continues, “that the validity of a specific legal 
system cannot be founded on rules coming from that same legal 
system, but should instead be derived from principles which are 
external to the system. Judges or legislators debating these monist 
or dualist positions, therefore, cannot flee from extra-legal 
principles of a moral nature in the wider sense in order to support 
their positions.”7 While monism will accentuate sovereignty, 
dualism in its two variations would prefer to emphasize the 
 4. Art. 27 and art. 31, Const. Arg. (author’s translation), available at: 
http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/congreso/Constitucion%20sola.pdf. 
 5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 
1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969); available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%20AM/Ch 
_XXIII_01p.pdf. 
 6. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, DERECHO, MORAL Y POLÍTICA. UNA REVISIÓN 
DE LA TEORÍA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 62 (Ariel 1994). 
 7. Id. at 62. 
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universality of rights. This allows for concluding that neo-
constitutional legal systems do not provide for a “closed system of 
justifiable solutions.”8 
V. RIGHTS AND IUS-FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES  
The constitutionalist and philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin, 
towards the end of the 1960s, brought to everyone’s attention the 
fact that the United States’ legal system enclosed two categories of 
norms: principles and rules.9 According to Dworkin, the positivist 
approach to the study of law had concentrated its analysis on the 
rules, without taking into sufficient account the existence of 
principles, nor the role they played within constitutional legal 
practices. This deficient attention to principles strongly 
conditioned, in his opinion, the plausibility of the description of 
law proposed by the work of Herbert Hart and his followers.10  
The main argument posed by Dworkin against Hart was that 
the rule of recognition, proposed by Hart as criteria for identifying 
valid positive law and distinguishing it from other normative 
systems, was incapable of detecting principles, whose existence in 
a legal system like the North American one is unquestionable. This 
is because the existence of principles within legal systems is not 
primarily grounded on the fact of their having been positively or 
explicitly acknowledged by legal institutions but, instead, on the 
fact of having been recognized by these same institutions as 
“intrinsically reasonable,” using an expression coined by Joseph 
Esser.11 
Avoiding the further and divergent debates raised by this line 
of reasoning, especially after the publication of Hart’s most famous 
 8. Id. 
 9. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 46 
(1967), reprinted in DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1977). 
 10. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1961). 
 11. JOSEF ESSER, PRINCIPIO Y NORMA EN LA ELABORACIÓN 
JURISPRUDENCIAL DEL DERECHO PRIVADO 87 (Eduardo Valentí Fiol trans., 
Bosch 1961). 
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work, Postscriptum,12 the truth is that the acceptance of 
“intrinsically reasonable” principles only makes sense if these refer 
to (that is to say, have as reference) goods whose character, as 
such, does not depend upon the legislator or judge who applies the 
principles.13 In other words, the presence of principles with these 
characteristics can only be explained through references to realities 
that exist beyond the scope of the positive law which 
acknowledges them and the constant effort of interpreting them 
according to the specific case at hand.  
VI. THE JUSTIFICATION AND THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY  
The recognition of human rights in constitutions (as 
fundamental rights or constitutional rights) has gone hand in hand 
with the spread of the practice known as “judicial review.” The 
latter is a creation of the United States Supreme Court, which 
allocates to judges the power to invalidate laws which they deem 
contrary to constitutional rights. While not denying the existence 
of important differences with that which different constitutional 
systems have previously incorporated, it cannot be questioned that 
judicial review is present in every constitutional practice.14  
Now then, how is this judicial review put into practice? In 
other words: how do judges determine that the statutory regulation 
of a fundamental or constitutional right violates what has been 
established as lawful in the constitution? Constitutional Law 
practice has responded to these questions with the principle of 
 12. Published posthumously in the second edition of Hart’s THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW; see Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for 
the Perplexed, Univ. of Michigan, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series, No. 77 (2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968657 and 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968657. 
 13. See Carlos I. Massini Correas, Razón práctica y objetividad del 
Derecho. El debate contemporáneo acerca de los principios jurídicos, 64 
SAPIENTIA 224-41 (2004). 
 14. Juan Cianciardo, The Principle of Proportionality: The Challenges of 
Human Rights, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 177-86 (2010).  
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proportionality.15 According to this principle, a statutory norm is 
considered constitutional if it suits three sub-principles: a) it should 
be adequate and therefore capable of producing its own point or 
end (sub-principle of adaptation); b) it should be necessary and, 
therefore, the least restrictive of the equally efficient ones (sub-
principle of necessity); c) lastly, it should be proportional stricto 
sensu, that is to say, it should express a proportionate deliberation 
concerning the benefits and prejudices which might result from the 
enforcement of the norm. 
The principle of proportionality refers without a doubt to 
evaluative instances that are situated beyond the domain of both 
the text of the norms under constitutional control, and the text of 
the constitution itself. This reference to a meta-positive instance is 
shown, at least, in the following two items: first, in the grounds for 
justifying the principle itself. Why is proportionality or 
reasonableness a constitutional principle? How are we to justify 
this constitutional requirement? Except at the cost of circularity, 
this question cannot be answered from the perspective of the 
constitution in question. Second, it becomes apparent in each of the 
sub-principles that frame the principle, since all of them refer to 
endsalthough from perspectives that do not entirely 
coincidewhose determination cannot be reduced to an internal 
analysis of the norms. 
VII. THE JUSTIFICATION AND CONTENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
REASONABLENESS 
A second feature of the dynamics of the “culture of rights” in 
which we are immersed is the principle of reasonableness. In the 
19th century, the dominant trend concerning the description of 
legal interpretation was “legal formalism.” This, in a very short 
 15. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 69, 414 (Julian 
Rivers trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002); see also CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO, EL 
PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales 2003). 
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synthesis, could be described as a theory which attempts to reduce 
the adjudication of law to deductive logic. In the 20th century, 
however, it was soon perceived that in order to establish the facts 
in each of the cases a judge must resolve and determine the 
applicable norms, requiring a decision to be made between various 
alternatives that are, prima facie, formally correct.16  
In effect, legal operators are compelled, on the one hand, to re-
construct the facts in a case, and this implies choosing: a) the 
legally relevant facts within a framework of facts, b) the legal 
means of evidence, and c) the most convincing evidence. On the 
other hand, judges and lawyers are faced with the need to: a) 
choose the applicable norms, b) choose the method or methods of 
interpretation with which they will apply the norms, and c) choose 
the results towards which these methods of interpretation lead.17 
These factual and normative choices raise the obvious question 
about the right criteria according to which they should be decided. 
While legal theories in the past century oscillated between, on the 
one hand, the practical conflation between discretion and 
unreasonableness,18 and, on the other hand, the practical negation 
of discretion or reasonableness,19 comparative constitutional 
analysis has come gradually to answer this question with the 
principle of reasonableness, as a counterpart to arbitrariness, 
expressly proscribed by some constitutions, as is the case, for 
example, of article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution.20  
 16. See ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, ON LAW AND REASON (2d ed., Springer 
2009). 
 17. In effect, “the notion of ‘reasonable’ is also used . . . at every stage of 
judicial reasoning: the determination of the facts, the qualification and 
interpretation of the applicable laws, the use of various rhetorical and logical 
formulas.” Oliver Corten, The Notion of “Reasonable” in International Law: 
Legal Discourse, Reason and Contradictions, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 613 
(1999). 
 18. HANS KELSEN, TEORÍA PURA DEL DERECHO 353 (2d ed., Porrúa 1993). 
 19. Dworkin, supra note 9. 
 20. Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution states:  
The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the hierarchy of 
legal provisions, the publicity of legal statutes, the non-retroactivity of 
punitive provisions that are not favorable to or restrictive of individual 
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In accordance with this principle, each and all of the decisions 
taken by a legal operator must demonstrably surpass the test of 
“reasonableness.” This means that a legal operator is obliged to 
give reasons and, particularly, to justify the reason for choosing a 
certain path from all the alternatives he is faced with. A decision 
without motivation is considered unreasonable, arbitrary, and thus 
a violation of the due process of law, or in the terms used in 
European Constitutional Law, a violation of effective judicial 
tutelage.21  
The justification and content of the principle of reasonableness 
raises questions analogous to those posed by the principles of 
proportionality: why reasonableness, and not the lack of 
reasonableness? How does one justify the use of this principle? 
Furthermore, which are the reasons that justify the establishment of 
facts and the determination of norms, and what are the grounds for 
these reasons? They cannot originate in the norms themselves 
because, once again, this would be circular. In other words, 
because the problem that must be dealt with consists of 
determining that which is not already determined by the norms 
themselves, the solution cannot lie in them but in something 
outside them, although connected with them.  
VIII. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION: RIGHTS TAKEN SERIOUSLY 
A few years ago, Robert Alexy explained that a normative 
system is not a legal system unless it formulates a “claim of 
correctness.”22 This occurs when governmental authorities act with 
rights, the certainty that the rule of law shall prevail, the accountability 
of public authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public 
authorities. (Author’s translation) 
 21. This allows the importance of the study of reasonability to be seen from 
the very beginning of a lawyer’s training. See Suzanne R. Painter, Improving the 
Teaching of School Law: A Call for Dialogue, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 213 
(2001).  
 22. See ROBERT ALEXY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTS (The Concept 
and Validity of the Law) (Karl Alber 2005); and Robert Alexy, On the Concept 
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the assumption that what they are doing is correct, regardless of 
whether it is actually entirely so. According to Alexy, when this 
assumption is not formulated, and when those who govern only 
take a personal or a class advantage with their power, practice of 
the law does not amount to a legal system. 
 Yet it seems evident that not just any content allocated to that 
which is assumed as correct will attain legality for a normative 
system. For this reason, Alexy complements his thesis on 
correctness with a reference to ius-fundamental principles. The 
correctness of the assumption of a government’s actions is 
basically expressed through its reference to fundamental rights. 
What does this mean? When does a State recognize, identify, 
protect, and promote rights? When does it put forth its “politics of 
rights” as imposed by its constitution?23 Or, in other words, how 
can human rights be consistently conceptualized, indexed, 
justified, and interpreted? In the preceding account, each of the 
problems being dealt with has directly involved these questions. 
The answer to such questions necessarily requires appealing to 
instances beyond the legal texts where rights are recognized, as I 
have attempted to demonstrate here in general terms. 
It could be thought, together with Norberto Bobbio, that the 
suggested element is a consensus,24 in which the basis of human 
rights could be found and the place where semantic indecisiveness 
could be resolved when interpreting them. Yet there is an argument 
and the Nature of Law, 21:3 RATIO JURIS 281,299 (2008). See also Eugenio 
Bulygin, Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality, 
13:2 RATIO JURIS 133, 137 (2000); and Robert Alexy, On the Thesis of a 
Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique, 13:2 
RATIO JURIS 138,147 (2000). 
 23. ANTONIO-LUIS MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, LA GARANTÍA DEL CONTENIDO 
ESENCIAL DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales 1997). 
 24. Norberto Bobbio, El fundamento de los derechos humanos in 
DICCIONARIO CRÍTICO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (Ramón Soriano Díaz, 
Carlos Alarcón Cabrera & Juan Mora Molina dirs. and coords., Universidad 
Internacional de Andalucía 2000). 
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which destroys all the appeal of this alternative: human rights 
discourse has been presented historically as the limit to what is 
“able to be settled by agreement,” or to paraphrase the German 
Constitutional Court, the “limit of limits” that consensus (including 
democratic consensus) can legitimately impose upon the freedom 
of human actions.25 In other words, if the meaning of rights 
depends on consensus, these rights are devoid of meaning. The 
solution, thus, must be found elsewhere.  
The question, however, is where? What has been presented 
here so far supports the proposal of a possible answer that lies in 
the following: all current legal systems formulate not one but two 
assumptions. On the one hand, the claim to correctness as 
postulated by Alexy, and on the other hand, a claim to moral 
objectivity, found implicitly in the defense of principles.26 Without 
one or the other, the discourse of rights turns into self-reference 
and, for this reason, becomes groundless and unintelligible.27  
 
 
 25. See BVerfGE 19, 342, 348. 
 26. PILAR ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD EN LA 
INTERPRETACIÓN JURÍDICA. UNA APROXIMACIÓN IUSFILOSÓFICA A LA TESIS DE 
LA DISCRECIONALIDAD (UNAM 2009; published as no. 142 in the ESTUDIOS 
JURIDICOS series). 
 27. As pointed out recently, it is noteworthy that the acceptance of the 
presence of moral elements in legal reasoning by neo-constitutionalists and 
inclusive positivists has not brought about further and more profound reflection 
on moral objectivity. Above all, a negative response to this last question would 
imply the negation of legal objectivity. See JUAN B. ETCHEVERRY, EL DEBATE 
SOBRE EL POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO INCLUYENTE. UN ESTADO DE LA CUESTIÓN 
(UNAM 2006), and ETCHEVERRY, OBJETIVIDAD Y DETERMINACIÓN DEL 
DERECHO. UN DIÁLOGO CON LOS HEREDEROS DE HART (Comares 2008; 
published as vol. 20 FILOSOFÍA, DERECHO & SOCIEDAD). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
